The basic problem in poverty measurement is how to weigh the income of different groups. This is a normative problem on which people differ in opinion, and hence we should seek a way of dealing with the issue that takes into account this plurality. In the paper, we suggest an approach to poverty measurement which avoids incorporating any particular normative position on how to weigh the interests of various poor groups, but rather reports on changes in poverty by making explicit the link between various normative positions and ordinal conclusions in poverty measurement. Within this framework, by applying a generalized version of Decartes' Rule of Signs, we present results that should provide useful guidance in a poverty comparison.
Introduction
Suppose the population size in a society is constant and we agree on an income poverty line.
2 In this case, the remaining problem in poverty measurement is how to weigh the income of different groups. Conventionally, we neglect the income of non-poor people, and hence the focus is on income differences in the poor group. Obviously, from an ordinal perspective, measurement of poverty is trivial if the change in income has the same direction for everyone in the poor group. However, in some situations, there is a conflict of interest within this group, and then in most cases we have to specify a weight function (or a class of functions) in order to solve the measurement problem. This is a normative problem on which people differ in opinion, and hence we should seek a way of dealing with the issue that takes into account this plurality.
In the poverty measurement literature, there are two kinds of responses to this problem.
On the one hand, poverty is frequently measured by applying a few specific weight functions (which also make available cardinal information). However, the choice of weight functions can be criticized for being rather arbitrary, and consequently it is of considerable interest to notice the framework of partial poverty orderings. Within this framework, general dominance results are established, which provide useful guidelines for when we can attain unambiguous ordinal conclusions in poverty measurement.
3
In this paper, we shall suggest a third possibility, which can provide some additional insight to this question. In the suggested approach, we will avoid incorporating any particular normative position on how to weigh the interests of various poor groups, but rather report on changes in poverty by making explicit the link between various normative positions and ordinal conclusions in poverty measurement. 4 We motivate this approach further in section 2, and elaborate on the formal framework in sections 3 and 4.
The main results are presented in section 5.
Motivation
Let us consider two examples, which will highlight some difficulties with the conventional approaches. In this discussion, assume that the poverty line z=100, the population size n=9, and q is the number of poor people.
First, consider two discrete income distributions { } it as sufficient to establish a restricted dominance result for this range. In this case, the framework of general dominance could give the impression of ambiguity that is not wellfounded in the public opinion.
The conventional approaches face opposite problems. If we content ourselves with applying a few specific weight functions, then we might demand to little in order to attain a conclusion in a poverty comparison; general dominance, on the other hand, might demand too much. In the following, we will outline an approach that in some sense avoids these problems, because the aim of the approach is slightly different from the standard in the literature. The aim is not to attain a specific ranking, but to elucidate in a comprehensive manner the link between various normative positions and ordinal conclusions in poverty comparisons.
implies that the level of poverty is the same in x and y.
7 α ≈ 51 32 , implies that the level of poverty is the same in x and z.
Preliminaries
In the following, we will work with cumulative distribution functions drawn from the set
0 1 is nondecreasing and right continuous;
be a parameter which value represents a normative position on how to weigh interests within the poor group. A class of poverty measures can now be defined as a function P:
, , where we assume that z > 0 . Hence, by way
α is the degree of poverty associated with the cumulative income distribution F when the normative parameter value is α . Let P be the set of all continuous functions of this kind.
In the analysis, we will narrow the discussion to the Foster et.al. class of poverty measures, which is a prominent poverty measure in the poverty measurement literature.
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By integrating by parts, the class can be represented as follows when we work with continuous income distributions:
The critical comparison value
An interesting strategy in ordinal poverty measurement might be to report on the normative parameter values that imply that the extent of poverty is considered to be the same in two income distributions. This approach will avoid the problems illustrated in section 2, and make the link between poverty measurement and normative reasoning more transparent.
In the following, we will refer to these normative values as critical comparison values, which can be defined formally as follows:
Obviously, the set of critical comparison values may in some cases be empty, as 
Analysis
At the outset, it is of interest to notice that there is no upper limit on the cardinality of the set of critical comparison values.
Observation: For any positive integer t, there are distribution functions
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, according to this observation, it might be quite difficult to single out the relevant critical comparison values in ordinal poverty measurement. But the picture becomes much more structured if we take into account the following proposition. Proof. Suppose that for some F G , ∈ F and k ≥ 1 , there are q changes in the sign of
Proposition: For any
We will prove that this implies that q is the upper limit of
(a) By integrating by parts, it follows that for α > k -1:
(b) (4) can be rewritten as follows:
∆ is a Riemann integral, and then in the usual manner we can write (5) as follows:
[ ]
α ∈ − ∞ k 1, , and thus, by choosing a sufficiently fine partition, the result follows from the generalized version of Decartes' Rule of Signs (see Borwein and Erdélyi (1995, p. 100-104) ).
Two immediate corollaries of this proposition should be noticed. where the conclusion depends on whether you defend a normative position defined by a value below or above the critical comparison value.
Concluding remarks
In poverty measurement, disagreement about how to weigh interests within the poor population sometimes makes it difficult to reach a conclusion that everyone can support.
In these cases, it can be of importance to make clear the implications of the relevant normative positions, and then leave it to the public debate (eventually) to settle the dispute. In this paper, we have introduced a framework that follows this route, and makes explicit the link between ordinal poverty measurement and various normative positions.
Two objections to this approach should be considered. First, it is clear that presently most individuals do not know their preferred value (or range) of the parameter, and thus we might question the relevance of making explicit the critical comparison values.
Proof of Observation
The proof goes by induction, but it will be useful first to notice the following lemma.
(a) The lemma is trivial in cases where
Otherwise, it can be proved by establishing the following inequality: Divide the integral into two parts, integrating first from 0 to y and then from y to z. It is now easily seen that the left hand side of (3) 
